dagNotes: A simple beginning for a critique of contemporary popular educational and pedagogical practice and the education reform movement

We decide to work with each other in public discourse communities to find a way to agree about certain things. Just this statement is problematic in the US, where most people assume we’ve arrived at public discourse having already agreed. When I teach, I try to promote consensus that permits social difference. After all, we are not all the same person with the same experiences. One of the first things a teacher confronts is whether or not to differentiate instruction. We tend to agree that we should differentiate, though many teachers still insist teaching is merely giving students information they must then work to learn. So, we have an initial problem from which to begin an examination.

Teaching that promotes a consensus or consensuses that permit(s) social difference is a difficult objective to achieve and for many reasons. To be a teacher thinking about practice and pedagogy would be very simple (as it appears to be for so many teachers) were I simply to ignore original social difference. If I were to accept that rhetoric is the means to promote a standard consensus that is predetermined for whatever reason, then teaching would be what it appears reformers think it is: a practice to provide students with a standard set of static skills that all students are assumed to need to possess to succeed after graduation. I don’t accept this and seek to illustrate the absurdity of imposing standards that compose individual students and teachers as the same student and teacher repeated everywhere at every time.

4 notes

dagNotes: the absurdity of discourse about taxation

We could very likely get away with taxing only wealthy white conservatives and their allies. Their lives and conversations about their lives are bolstered by the notion they are burdened by every one else and “taxes” are proof of that burden, thus proof of their supposed earned ambition and right to every thing they possess. 

Without taxes how would they know this burden that justifies their social position and unearned wealth?

8 notes

dagNotes: On Literary Theory and Application

Literary theory is often treated as but should not be a thing one studies and then applies to literary texts like a sticker to a car’s rear bumper. Theory does not adhere to literary text as some sort of useful appendage or locating device that permits readers-in-the-know to get something inexperienced readers will overlook.

Literary theory is something that works to assemble a text for a specific use in culture, politics, society, discourse, simple conversation.

I always took theory much more seriously than many of my literature-student colleagues who seemed most apt at reading blurbs about theorists than they did at reading theoretical texts. Literary conferences are always stocked with panels where authors of papers apply fragments of theoretical work to favorite texts as if the theory were a fashionable band-aid, as if paragraphs within theoretical works were existent outside of the unified work. The papers act to distinguish their authors rather than to implement the text in a useful manner within wider discourse.

Here, application does not mean applying to theory something with my name on it. Application should help me understand relevance, as I wrote above, help me assemble a text for a specific purpose.

Deleuze, like Nietzsche and Derrida, is often abused by literary theorists who carelessly littler their papers with out-of-context quotes that appear to relate to often common interpretations of literary texts. How easily this one that I posted earlier and was thinking about when writing this note is misused:

Writing has a double function: to translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblages. The two are the same thing.—Deleuze and Guattari. “Immanence and Desire” Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature

dagNotes: The Regressives (Saying What We Mean)

In everyday politics, we like to implement a problematic binary that has a left and a right, that improperly imagines a central, moderating axis upon which a balance can be managed or else all tilts towards partiality and inequality. It’s a comforting fantasy for millions of people. It’s a product of populist common-sense that works to rid discourse of complexity and paradox. It’s a-philosophical.

As a teacher, I hear the rhetoric of left and right all the time. Students always want to find The Other Side in an argument because they have been taught that a balance must be sought. As if there are only ever two sides worth considering and that society and its culture are monolithic. On the other hand, this searching for a center upon which to moderate disagreement doesn’t occur when a student visits my office to discuss writing or class. It happens when the students are in discourse within the classroom. This implicates me, their teacher. This implicates their parents, their friends, in other words, society. At least, it illustrates how two people discussing significant problems can talk freely only when isolated from the public discourse community, that, once we are engaged with it, will slowly locate our claims within a pre-designed social space that seeks a fantastic mean as a solution to our complex problems. In another post, I would be able to illustrate that the center in political discourse is similar to the grotesque representation of an ideal American—that racist Middle-Class, White, Christian Male, himself one who has never existed.

Liberals are certainly not left of an imagined center. They are not progressive. I argue, they cannot be progressive. Populist conservatives are little more than proud authoritarians. We can see their lack of progressivity through simple observation. They simply cannot look forward. They choose not to look forward while liberals claim to choose to look forward. However, this disposition to look back should not be used to oppose liberals to conservatives as progressives. Liberals are entirely backward looking. It’s just that liberals look back to an imagined complex of ideals to find peace and harmony whereas conservatives look back to find authority and stability. To be sure, both want to bolster the same corrupt capitalist culture.

Let’s drop the popular “progressives” tag, shall we? Let’s take liberals, “moderates” (whatever they are,) and conservatives, strip away their precious Binary, and replace it with something that will cause a critical stir. Insist on bringing conflict into the placid pond of popular American political discourse. These folks do, after all, have something in common. They are not-progressive; they are regressive. Within the popular social regressive movement, liberals and conservatives attempt to reach consensus about how to reconstruct a society that has yet to exist. They like to think the attempt to reach consensus enacts Democracy and celebrates a Liberty to do so. They believe this illustrates their superiority to an imagined other. It’s a matter of fact, that this is not the case.

Key to my claim: Social regressives project their disorder onto others, but projection of disorder is not enough to justify a stupid binary.

Not that we need to throw stupid titles around to talk about politics. I need not know or accept individual sentiment in every participant in a discourse community in order to participate in a political discussion. However, identity is important and we should be able to be honest about the form of rhetoric and space within social movements. Liberals and Conservatives are not members of wings of US politics. They not only share but actively cultivate the same regressive social space(s) in which they speak the same language and seek to fulfill similar if not the same objectives. They are already in consensus about the status quo. In addition, they are incapable of looking ahead. In other words, they share similar if not the same morality.

Liberalism and Conservativism may sound different because we have a recent past in which philosophers and theorists worked to construct distinct traditions. We have left those projects behind. Pointing to them does not make them relevant. 

dagNotes: on rights and privileges

dagseoul:

The entire discourse about rights and privileges in the United States has never actually been a collective nor inclusive conversation about our rights. Quite the contrary, the conversation has always been contra the limitations, usurpations, or loss of a specific kind of privileges often referred to as rights and for specific people. This specificity begins with what the original colonizers constructed as basic human rights, which were the result of little more than so-called “enlightened” discourse about the privileges enjoyed by educated and Christian, white men who owned land and/or enjoyed a strong inheritance.

When we discuss our rights and privileges, we should be willing to admit we’re engaging a conversation that remains, as it is historically, white supremacist in both content and intent. When we discuss, as is popular, an ongoing restriction or prohibition of our rights and privileges, we are reconstructing a racist historical narrative and imposing it on individuals who aren’t white— who are nevertheless fellow citizens and/or immigrants—and who have had to bear the burden of white privilege, laws, and the construction of our rights throughout our short history.

(dedicated to libertarians-and-stoya.)

dagNotes: on rights and privileges

The entire discourse about rights and privileges in the United States has never actually been a collective nor inclusive conversation about our rights. Quite the contrary, the conversation has always been contra the limitations, usurpations, or loss of a specific kind of privileges often referred to as rights and for specific people. This specificity begins with what the original colonizers constructed as basic human rights, which were the result of little more than so-called “enlightened” discourse about the privileges enjoyed by educated and Christian, white men who owned land and/or enjoyed a strong inheritance.

When we discuss our rights and privileges, we should be willing to admit we’re engaging a conversation that remains, as it is historically, white supremacist in both content and intent. When we discuss, as is popular, an ongoing restriction or prohibition of our rights and privileges, we are reconstructing a racist historical narrative and imposing it on individuals who aren’t white— who are nevertheless fellow citizens and/or immigrants—and who have had to bear the burden of white privilege, laws, and the construction of our rights throughout our short history.

(dedicated to libertarians-and-stoya.)

one of many problems with the social justice tumblr

Highly structured identities contra traditional identities depend on similar ideologization. And, though cut from the same ideological tapestry, 

a counterpublic cannot be a public nor a public a counterpublic at the same time.

dagNotes: on looking beyond logical fallacies

We often over-focus on informal logic and fallacies. The pamphlet I just linked to is mostly a catalog of fallacies. Sure, it’s good to know what a logical fallacy is, how to see one, what to do about it. Yet, the most annoying arguments are with the dorks policing discourse for informal fallacies.

People participating in discourse often achieve entry into discourse communities possessing different tools: experiences, knowledge, educations, wisdom, et al. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with calling out a guy like Ron Paul, the POTUS, Hegel, or your teacher for using fallacies that form the grounding warrants for their claims. But I stay away from doing it to my students, for example, in classrooms. Although I’ll write about fallacies in responses to writing. On Tumblr, the desire to point out logical fallacies often, not always, betrays a failure to attempt to understand and visualize what a blogger is trying to say.

A good critical thinker is capable of speaking with others in a way that pointing out fallacies may not be necessary to make a point about disagreement with others. I often write the claims of the person I’m speaking with in my own words, carefully paraphrasing or directly citing, and then reply using both reasonable claims and examples. I can fairly represent a claim without implementing logical fallacies that may only be the result of rushed composition or lack of experience creating prose. In other words, I can show that I know what someone is thinking without their mistake(s) in logic in a manner that also shows I know they are, in fact, thinking about something at all. It’s fair, in my opinion. It’s also a way of thinking and writing that permits disagreement while seeking consensus.

On the other hand, I think excellent critical thinking will always be sensitive to unstated assumptions that are left as implied claims, often without reasons. Sometimes we are simply unaware of our assumptions because we haven’t really thought about the meaning of what we’re saying, and for all sorts of reasons. It’s good to point out unacknowledged unstated-assumptions.

The Week In Horrible Writing: The New Republic’s Jonathan Chait

When I find an essay that appears to be intelligent political criticism yet turns out to be anti-intellectual crap with weird appeals to common sense you’d likely find in pseudo-intellectual conservative discourse in something like The Weekly Standard or The National Review, I’d bet I’m reading The New Republic.

I want to quickly define a concept I use below to address an aspect of the author’s style. Jonathan Chait uses something I like to call hip wit. Hip wit is comfortable, lazy intellectualism that you find in cafe culture, dorm rooms, department meetings, writing workshops, seminars. Sitting around a table with your smart friends, hip wit colors debates about topical topics only tolerating amusing and sometimes seemingly enigmatic zingers that make your friends and colleagues chuckle. It’s smartypants riffing, verbal jamming. Hip Wit is hollow nonsense in opposition to the riffing, playful dialogue that an intelligent autodidact creates. In other words, it’s rehearsed. Hip Wit is stylized bullshit.

On Jonathan Chait’s “Liberalism’s Bumper Sticker Problem”:

The New Republic readers will nod their heads at this title. The author desperately needs that nodding affirmation because his essay won’t attempt to explain the complex implicatures in its messy logic.The problem isn’t necessarily liberalism, is it? The problem is a rank, American anti-intellectual tradition that insists turning complex discourse about serious problems into nonsensical phrases we distribute via cars and culture—automobile bumpers and invisible binaries. This bumper sticker problem is both a liberal and conservative problem. Certainly, we can admit both the hippy and the gun-toting hick—the bleeding-heart liberal and the apple-pie conservative—use their bumpers to communicate to friends and enemies alike.

“Liberalism’s Bumper Sticker Problem” might suggest to a reader the author’s going to address liberalism’s stupid attempt to compete with conservative propaganda via absurd bumper sticker discourse. A reader would be wrong. The title is a bit deceptive. As we’ll see, Chait’s conclusion merely refers once again to the assumed problem.  And this is weird because his first point is about writing that resists advancing its narrative.

Chait opens with a note about narrative:

Ryan Lizza’s latest must-read New Yorker piece is framed as the story of President Obama’s abandonment of the doctrine of foreign policy realism and adoption of “consequentialism.” It’s filled with a lot of reporting that doesn’t really advance that narrative but is really interesting anyway.

 It’s a critique of “the reporting”: it’s interesting reporting but fails to advance the narrative. I don’t really get it and it sounds a little insider-y to me. Anway, what’s his beef? Chait’s essay is nothing more than a digression about an interesting idea. He also writes, “I was amused by one advisor’s attempt to boil this doctrine down to a bumper sticker”. He then cites one of Obama’s national security advisors boiling something down to a bumper sticker and failing to do so.  Of course, the advisor’s statement is supposed to be funny in an inside baseball sort of way. I think that’s clear: the speaker counted on his audience inferring that he believes we should resist bumper sticker messaging.

Chait’s first paragraph confesses one of two things to an intelligent and focused audience: 1) I like what I have to say so much that I’m going to share my trifles with you, the lucky readers; or, 2) I didn’t really work out all the complexities of this idea I had the other day, so I’m offering you an excuse for why you might disagree with me. The first is arrogant, the second lazy. My conclusion is that Chait is both arrogant and imprecise.

Imprecise? Sure. Liberals are not doing a good job distilling their messages into bumper sticker simplicity, correct? Isn’t that a problem with liberalism? Haven’t I heard this somewhere? Well, sure I have. It’s only one of the most popular conservative critiques of liberalism that isn’t necessarily true. It goes like this: Conservatives are good at messaging while Liberals are not. It’s not amusing. It’s not accurate. It’s not precise. If a simple trope (Liberalism is antithetical to Conservativism) is used well in public discourse, Chait seems to believe that’s good enough reason to rely on it in his argument. His essay appears to accept that our cultural and political discourse is only as good as the design of its slogans is precise.

I’m getting off-topic. Chait continues:

The bumper sticker problem is endemic for American liberalism. On foreign policy, it’s actually a murky split, with ideologies cutting across both party coalitions. But on economics, there’s a persistent phenomenon of conservatives having clear bumper-sticker answers and liberals lacking them. That’s because, as I’ve argued before, conservatism is philosophically anti-government in a way that liberalism is not philosophically pro-government. “Market good, government bad” fits on a bumper sticker. So does “Government good, market bad.” The problem is that the former pretty well describes the Republican philosophy, while the latter describes the philosophy only of a tiny socialist fringe operating mainly outside the two-party system.

As with his stupid assertion about how “the reporting” reports “without advancing the narrative,” he stupidly asserts something about a “tiny socialist fringe” and its viable bumper sticker, “Government good, market bad”. Chait never has claimed, to my knowledge, that he’s a well-read historian, theorist and/or economist, but his binary for a conservative v liberal as pro-market v anti-market or anti-government v pro-market is horseshit. He may not be an expert, but he’s smart enough to resist making insipid claims.

I hate to break it to Chait, but the binary his assumptions are anchored within are a conservative construction representing the reality (realities, possibly,) of American discourse and culture as it is used to represent other complex political realities. It’s at least two steps removed from the issue he’s trying to address. The representation itself is anti-intellectual because its construction depends upon traditional representations of Americans that no longer (and never did) accurately imagine Americans. I want to say two things about the bumper-sticker binary: 1) Conservatives do not actually believe government is bad as their deregulation efforts actually amount to subtle regulations that aggressively redistribute wealth and 2) Socialists don’t think the market is bad.

All social actions in the United States take place in “the market”. I put the phrase in quotes because I think we should use “a market”. Conservative Americans like to believe that there is only our market, the market, as if it’s an actual place where we live. But it’s not a place, is it? And everything we do in the market creates a greater, ever-increasing social order that regulates our lives. We can choose to regulate this order or not regulate it.  But that’s not the same as passing or not passing legislation.

Republicans and Libertarians, and some progressive conservatives and liberals, would argue that these are the same things. It serves a purpose to do so. Taxing is seen, then, as redistributing wealth while not-taxing is seen as freeing people and businesses from regulation.  But that’s a stupid and mistaken way to see the action Republicans take in Congress when legislating tax reform to reduce corporate and wealthy citizens taxes. In this case, Republicans actually love the shit out of government, as do Libertarians, the liars that they are.

I’m also uncomfortable with Chait’s lazy shifting from conservative to Republican and liberal to Democrat. We should insist on consistency and focus in our writing. If we want to write about Liberalism’s Problems we might want to insist we are adressing Liberalism itself rather than the conservative movement’s widely distributed representation of Liberalism.

Moving on, Chait insists:

Liberalism is forever in search of a philosophy that can fit on a bumper sticker. It’s always failing, because a philosophy of leaving the free market to work except in cases of market failure, and then attempting to determine which intervention best passes the cost-benefit test is never going to be simple.

Well, I don’t know what to say about this. The Liberalism Is Always Failing claim is trite. Liberalism has actually been extremely successful over the last 112 years. Chait’s is a libertarian’s critique of popular liberalism from the left and is a rank oversimplification of reality that rather strangely fits his musing about Liberalism’s Bumper Sticker Problem.

At this point, it’s clear that Chait constructs his argument not so that he learns something about a complex idea he wants to explore, an engaging idea that he had while reading Rizza in The New Yorker. He’s not writing in search of meaning at all. This is hip wit at work. He’s had an idea already and has been looking for a place to put it, for a time to share it. And while reading The New Yorker, he saw an opportunity to make it fit in the wider discourse about problems liberals have with creating bumper-sticker messages.

It’s unfortunate, because if he’d spent some time thinking about the actual problem rather than the rhetoric about the problem, he’d have a wonderful piece about the strikingly stupid and aggressively anti-intellectual approach we use to distribute important cultural messages to one another via media outlets. Journalists and Pundits unthinkingly transmit these messages and then, like Chait does in this essay, say amusing things about them.  Yet, even the musing never actually approaches useful work. It’s not even meta.

I’m going to skip Chait’s reference to Dana Milbank’s discussion about Obama’s strengths and weaknesses. I’d have to get started on Milbank, who almost never is a useful source for information. Chait concludes:

There’s a psychological equivalence between the certainty of left and right, but the midpoint of the mirror image does not happen to run right between the split between two parties. American politics today is a kind of one-and-a-half ideology system, with a Republican Party acting as the arm of a coherent conservative movement staunchly opposed to government, and a Democratic Party acting as a kind of catch-all for everybody who doesn’t accept the conservative agenda. It’s no coincidence that one party keeps producing leaders who think in simple ways, while the other keeps producing leaders who think in complicated ways.

The first sentence is worthless. It’s the most contrived way to say something simple: the left and the right may be more similar than different. DER DUH DUDE. Pseudo-intellectuals love public masturbation and it almost never produces engaging writing. If you’re a writer, the important thing to remember is rather practical: after that silly, artificial, complicated, contrived sentence you can often find one that directly states a useful and meaningful idea. Cut the bullshit and keep the useful sentence. Chait doesn’t fail to illustrate my point. After his ridiculous psycho-babble, he claims, “American politics today is a kind of one-and-a-half ideology system”. I like that. I want to know more about this.

Unfortunately, Chait doesn’t do a good job of explaining himself. On the other hand, he continues to promote the improper and insidious assumption that the Republican Party is a coherent community representing a coherent conservative movement while the Democratic Party exists as an poorly defined area where people who don’t like Republicans, who disagree with conservatives, mingle. I don’t think it would take much for me to illustrate how Republicans use, without admitting to it, many of the principles of liberalism in capitalism that most self-identifying liberals in the Democratic Party support.

At each step along the way, Jonathan Chait resists critical thought and exploration of engaging complex ideas about his musings in order to arrive at his conclusion. He concludes, “It’s no coincidence that one party keeps producing leaders who think in simple ways, while the other keeps producing leaders who think in complicated ways.” We began with Chait implying that he was going to address a problem that might, he hinted, advance the narrative. We learned that whatever the problem was, Chait was not going to address it because he wanted to dwell on the anti-intellectual, common sense notion that Republicans successfully use simple messages to discuss complex issues to their constituents while Democrats consistently fail to say something most of us can understand without effort.

I don’t know what we’re supposed to make of this conclusion. It’s both a compliment and an insult for both Republicans and Democrats. It’s a cheeky statement. It’s supposed to be amusing, I guess, because Chait says he was amused when it occurred to him. Again, when a writer narrates his own thinking about the issue he’s addressing, he’s often constructing an excuse for its acceptance in lieu of actual work.

This is the worst political writing I’ve seen all week.

Libertarian Authoritarianism: I must get my way, or else! (Very Objective.)

Thought I’d share this story from John Nichols (The Nation) about Paul Ryan’s melt-down when things stopped going his way. Nichols highlights the true authoritarian nature of the self-interested American conservative.

Paul Ryan likes to talk libertarianism-lite: “less government equals more freedom”. Like most conservatives with libertarian ideological positions, he really means that he doesn’t trust the democratic process. Objectively, conservatives want as little discourse as possible. They want their way, and that’s it. The more people learn what Ryan’s vision of liberty in the free market means, the more they hate it.

“Shut it down!” screeched Ryan. “Shut it down!” (The Nation, 16.4.11)