DagSeoul: Positions, Populations, Punk, Poetics

So, here we have a study that is designed to reward liberals for their enlightenment while ignoring that liberal tolerance is rather viciously racist.

Here’s what I find to be a problematic take of it in The Washington Post.

Never mind that, but what do you think about the fact that this ignores imperialism and colonialism? Is it any surprise the blue countries were settled by colonizers while the reddish nations like Korea and India were long occupied and rejected occupation as a matter of independence? It seems like the blue nations get to congratulate themselves for their forced integration that is long in the past while the red nations are being punished for their nationalism the result of recent independence. Not at all ignoring evident oppressive bigotries in India and Korea, just pointing out that using “wealth” is convenient and might highlight a bias in the research.

And France has a different conception of sovereignty and so I’m not at all surprised that reactionary whites are annoyed that immigrants of color are as French as they are. France is the outlier here, not Korea.

What do you all think?

If you want to “eat the rich”, what happens when there are no longer any rich people to eat?

communismkills:

You starve.

This is a perfect analogy for the people who think they can tax other people out of the national debt, people who think they can tax other people to pay for their things, and people who think the rich will always be there to support their horrible welfare addiction.

A 1.6 trillion dollar tax increase is devastating.

This is a perfect example for why we don’t use crappy analogies to define real, social problems. Paying Taxes is not comparable to Eating Food in any way.

Although you might want to think twice about your insipid analogy because of what it implies about the capitalist classes. That you grant them something you don’t grant the laboring classes: surplus. You might want to think about the implications because it you permit wealthy people unearned ambition and demand poorer people prove theirs.

Good job, shitegob.

"Currently, in the store, 80% of the food has been laced with sugar. This limits consumer choice. In fact, you can’t go into a poor neighborhood in America and get something that’s not processed… They don’t have availability. Now whose fault is that? Is that the fault of the poor person? If you have no choice, how can [weight/health] be personal responsibility?"

(x)

(Source: darkj-fitness, via codelens)

"The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of the material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno, it presupposes the action of producing the stick. Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implication and to accord it its due importance."

Marx, The German Ideology

(Source: teaandthorazine, via scarylenin-deactivated20121014)

It’s available as a free audiocast. And you can find it online at the usual places.

Also:

• Senate Committee Comes Down Hard on For-Profit Colleges 

And for reading:

• The Assault on Universities: A Manifesto for Resistance (UK)
• Unmaking the Public University: The 40 Year Assault on The Middle Class (I know “assault on the middle class” makes me cringe, but it’s a book that addresses the attack on universities from a US perspective. Visit the notes, bibliography, and index and branch out from there. It’s a Harvard UP book, after all, and is being marketed to liberals and conservatives concerned about education, and these folks like to think about the mythic middle class. Is this just a US thing or do we get this from the UK and Europe?)

Posting for libertarians-and-stoya. Learn up.

Black unemployment rates are double that of Whites cause even if we’re more qualified, a White person with a record could get hired before us. Even our names could keep us from employment. We can’t even get hired with a degree against a White person who doesn’t have one. And even if we have a job, we’re more likely than a White person to get laid off. Thus, the wealth gap has gotten bigger and bigger.

And that leaves you with Black families seven times as likely to be homeless. 

We have an education achievement gap because Black public schools are so shitty and underfunded. Our kids get put in special ed courses and disciplined/suspended from school at disproportionate rates… which I suppose is to prepare them for the police.

We get constantlyharassed by the police which has led to us being more likely to be incarcerated… Hell, even though we’re 12% of the U.S. population, we make up the majority of the prison population. 

And don’t even let me get into the access to quality health care and statistics on black health. Many of us can’t even get a damn grocery store in our neighborhoods. And the ones that do have grocery stores are less likely to have fresh produce.

And on top of it all, we have to listen to White people fucking complain all the damn time about nothing because most of you have NO idea what it’s like to have a fucking real problem that cannot be solved simply because of the skin color you were born with. 

Like, what the fuck more could you possibly want White people?????? What the hell else do you need to satisfy your Whiteness? 

(Source: knowledgeequalsblackpower, via codelens)

"There is in fact no event which is not in one sense anecdotal. Except in idealist historiography, even the appearance of a Spinoza or a Marx has ‘historical scope’ only through and for the (more or less distant) time which will heed their thoughts. Otherwise, it may even be the repression of their thought which constitutes history.

Furthermore, have ‘structural relations’ ever been modified by ‘a fact’? The most conscious of revolutions have so far modified them only very imperfectly. Not to speak of techniques. Papin ‘sees’ the power of steam, and Watt tames it, but his ‘innovation’ must be ‘implanted’ in order to become a true ‘force of production’. Amongst other factors, in one limited world. Where is the ‘break’?

Professional sensationalists like to multiply ‘events’. ‘Historic facts’ are all the rage on a day of lunar landings or barricades. It may be objected: exactly, the theorist has to choose. But choose what? The housewife who cannot or will not pay ten francs a kilo for beans, or the one who does buy, the conscript who joins his draft, or the one who refuses? They are all acting ‘historically’. Conjunctures depend on them, they are reinforcing or undermining structures. However imperfect its interpretation may still be, it is the objectification of the subjective through statistics which alone makes materialist history possible—the history of masses, that is both of massive, infrastructural facts, and of those human ‘masses’ which theory has to ‘penetrate’ if it is to become an effective force.

One is led to wonder if the theorist of the concept of history has not spent so much energy attacking a type of history that is now outmoded, that he has unwittingly become its prisoner. Having allowed history to be divided up among ‘specialists’ he then sets out in search of ‘historical facts’ and ‘events’. An event certainly has its importance, above all its place—fortuitous or integrable—within the series of which it forms a part. But although he will mistrust the excesses of the ‘anti-eventful’ historiography which has transformed historical practice in the last forty years, the Marxist historian remains loyal to its central principle, which was that of Marx. He can have nothing to do, even verbally, with the myth of ‘the days which made France’ or even with ‘the days that shook the world’. Eisenstein’s October ends with the declaration: ‘The revolution is over’. We know very well that it was just beginning."

— “Marxist History, A History in the Making Towards a Dialogue With Althusser” by Pierre Vilar, from The New Left Review, July-August 1973.

"On the contrary what we must strive to think out historically (if we want to ‘understand the facts’ as Marx likes to say) is how a theory, because it is partial (the theory of one level of one mode of production) yet claims universality, may serve simultaneously as a practical and as an ideological tool, in the hands of one class, and for one period of time. This time has to be ‘constructed’, it is true, since it consists of alternating defeats and successes, movements of pessimism and optimism, moments when even appearances (profits) have to be camouflaged, and moments when the reality itself (surplus value) can be exalted, if only when it is rediscovered during phases of expansion, as investment, as the basis of enlarged reproduction. But what matters most is the perception of what is invariably disguised, because it is given the status of an untouchable hypothesis—the equivalent of landed property for the physiocrats,which for the capitalist mode of production is: (i) the private appropriation of the means of production; (ii) the determination of value by the market.

Once these ‘relations of production’ are taken for granted, there is of course no reason why one may not theorize effectively on the economic level or elucidate the ‘economic history’ of the lands and epochs where such relations have prevailed. But this is just why the historian who wants to be a Marxist will refuse to confine himself within ‘economic history’ (except to study this or that case empirically). I have said on other occasions and I will maintain that so-called ‘quantitative histories’ are nothing but retrospective econometrics, and that the ‘New Economic History’ cannot measure the realm of Clio. As Colin Clark has stated, history stands ‘higher up’ in the hierarchy of the sciences than economics, because it contains the latter. Fidelity to Marx demands that one add: and because it cannot be divided."

“Marxist History, A History in the Making Towards a Dialogue With Althusser” by Pierre Vilar, from The New Left Review, July-August 1973.

"

1. The Importance of the Problem of Value.

The problem of value has constituted a fundamental question of political economy since the earliest days of the science. All other questions, such as wage-labour, capital, rent, accumulation of capital, the struggle between large-scale and petty operation, crises, etc., are directly or indirectly involved in this fundamental question.

“The theory of value stands, as it were, in the centre of the entire doctrine of political economy,” Böhm-Bawerk rightly observes. (Grundzüge der Theorie des wirtschaftlichen Güterwerts, p.8.) This is not hard to understand; price, and therefore the standard determining price — which is value — is the fundamental all-embracing category in the production of commodities in general and in the capitalist production of commodities in particular, whose child is political economy. The prices of commodities regulate the distribution of the production forces of capitalist society; the form of exchange, whose presupposition is the category of price, is the form of distribution of the social product among the various classes.

The movement of prices leads to an adaptation of the supply of goods to demand, since the rise and fall of the rate of profit causes capital to flow from one branch of production to another. Low prices are the weapon by which capitalism cuts its path and finally conquers the world: it is low prices that enable capital to eliminate artisan production, to supplant petty operation with large-scale operation.

The contract between the capitalist and the worker — the first condition for the enrichment of the capitalist — assumes the form of a purchase of labour power, i.e., the form of a price relation. Profit the expression in terms of money-value, but not the natural expression of surplus product, is the driving motive of modern society: on this precisely rests the entire process, of the accumulation of capital, which destroys the old forms of economy and is distinguished sharply from them in its evolution as an entirely specific historical phase of the economic evolution. etc. Therefore the problem of value has again and again attracted the attention of economic theorists in far higher measure than any other problem of political economy. Adam Smith, David Ricardo. Karl Marx — all took the analysis of value as the basis of their investigations.[62] The Austrian school also made the theory of value the corner-stone of its system, having undertaken to oppose the classics and Marx and to create their own theoretical system, they necessarily concerned themselves chiefly with the problem of value.

It follows that the theory of value in reality still occupies the central position in present day theoretical discussions, although John Stuart Mill already considered this question disposed of. (John Stuart Mill, ibid., p.209.) As opposed to Mill, Böhm-Bawerk believes that the theory of value has still remained “one of the most unclear, most confused, and most disputed sections of our science”; (Böhm-Bawerk, Grundzüge, etc., p.8), yet he hopes that the studies of the Austrian School will put an end to this confused state. “It seems to me that certain labours performed in recent and very recent days,” he says, “have introduced the creative thought into this confused ferment, from a fruitful development of which we may expect complete clearness.” (Ibid., p.8.)

We shall attempt below to subject this “creative thought” to the necessary examination; but let us state at the outset that the critics of the Austrian School often point out that the latter has confused value with use-value; however, that its theory belongs rather to the domain of psychology than to that of political economy, etc. No doubt this objection is fundamentally correct. Yet we do not think our judgment should end here. We must rather proceed from the point of view of the representatives of the Austrian School, we must grasp the whole system in its internal relations, and only then reveal its contradictions and insufficiencies, the products of its fundamental fallacies. For instance, value has been variously defined. Böhm-Bawerk’s definition will necessarily differ from that of Karl Marx. But it is not sufficient to declare simply that Böhm-Bawerk does not touch the essence of the matter, i.e., that he does not treat that which should be treated; rather, we must show why his treatment is wrong. Furthermore, it must be shown that the presuppositions from which the theory in question proceeds lead either to contradictory constructions or fail both to include and explain a number of important economic phenomena.

But where is there any point of departure for criticism in this case? If the conception of value is completely different even in the most varied tendencies, i.e., if, according to Marx, it has no points of contact at all with that of Böhm-Bawerk, how will it be possible to formulate a criticism at all? In this situation, however, we are aided by the following circumstance: great as are the differences between the definitions of value, though they may even contradict each other in places, they nevertheless have something in common, namely, in conceiving value as a standard of exchange, in that the conception of value serves to explain price.[63] Of course, the explanation of prices alone is not sufficient, or, more properly, we have no right to limit ourselves to an explanation of prices; yet the theory of value is the direct basis for the theory of price. If the corresponding theory of value solves the question of price without internal contradictions, it is a correct theory; if not, it must be rejected.

These are the considerations from which we shall proceed in our criticism of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory.

We have seen in the preceding section that price is considered by Böhm-Bawerk to be the resultant of individual evaluations. His “theory” therefore is divided into two parts: the first part investigates the laws of the formation of individual evaluations — “the theory of subjective value” — the second part investigates the laws of the origin of their resultant — “the theory of objective value.”

Such a strong introduction to his Chapter, The Theory of Value. Liking this a lot.

from Economic Theory of the Leisure Class. Nikolai Bukharin 1927

The libertarians says, “Value is subjective.” I say, “So, what?”

 A comment on your rhetoric.

logicallypositive: …value is not an inherent trait. it doesn’t arise out of labor, it doesn’t arise out of property. Value is prescribed to an object through conscious action. Value isn’t “imbued” into an object through the labor process, or somehow arbitrarily determined by how much it costs to make something.

This is just poor argument, most likely the result of lazy self-righteousness. I expect more from you.

Labor is a conscious action. Labor processes are the result of conscious action. The thinking about labor is a conscious action. The social process(es) of labor and the thinking process(es) about it are conscious actions.

To imbue is a kind of inspiring that recognizes something in a performance or object. Meaning is the result of such conscious action. In other words, conscious action is to imbue a thing or process with value. To imbue is not an eruption but an irruption. You write, “[value] doesn’t arise out labor,” etc. You don’t even have your claims traveling in the same direction regarding the objects you’re addressing.

(Source: rigatonideology, via dagseoul)

The libertarians says, “Value is subjective.” I say, “So, what?”

logicallypositive:

value comes from our individual preferences and desires. value is not an inherent trait. it doesn’t arise out of labor, it doesn’t arise out of property. Value is prescribed to an object through conscious action. Value isn’t “imbued” into an object through the labor process, or somehow arbitrarily determined by how much it costs to make something. our valuation of a good or service is implicit in our actions, in our decisions to choose attaining said object over other objects. In this sense, valuation is function of the satisfaction of subjective desires.

However, that’s not the value we talk about when we’re talking about how capital is self-valorizing. Moreover, nobody argues value is inherent in objects. It’s produced; it’s recognized; it transforms as objects are exchanged, and differently when exchanged for other objects or money.

The beginning of your exploration nicely misrepresents the position we all know you’re going to argue against. Common sense arguments can not ever handle the contradictions and complexities of real situations and so must oversimplify, always in the name of practicality. It’s not going to stand with any one who knows both positions. (Actually, there’s three here: Marxian, Austrian, Neoclassical. It’s just you’re going to straw man one to make the other look practical and common sense, which is typical of libertarians when it comes to Marxian economics.)

Furthermore, valuation is determined not by the utility of a general class of objects, but rather by the utility of a single unit of that object. In other words, value is determined not only by the fulfillment of subjective desires, but also by the marginal utility of an object. To give an example, let’s say you have $40. $10 of it is spent on food, $10 on gas, $10 on entertainment and $10 on clothes (in this hypothetical world, everything is generally pretty cheap except food lol). Now, let’s say for some reason, you need to save $10 for a future date.. You only have $40, so in order to save $10 you necessarily have to sacrifice one of the four things you are purchasing. What the individual would give up depends on that particular person, but the point is the person is going to give up purchasing that item which they value least in order to save the $10, which they value more for its use at a future date. Therefore, we can safely say that the value of $10 is determined, in a sense, by whatever good it is the individual would sacrifice purchasing.

OF COURSE the specific form of value you’re addressing must be subjective. That’s why I can exchange something that’s worth more to you for money or stuff that’s worth more to me, right? Because that thing I gave to you has more value for you than it does for me. And that money or stuff you gave me has less value for you than it does for me.

That’s Marx. Capital, Volume One.

If you interpret value in this sense, it really explains a lot more about the world. For example, why a heroin addict chooses heroin over food. Why some people pay hundreds of thousands of dollars on shiny rocks. Why some people value gold and silver so heavily. Why some people will pay money to purchase a Lady Gagaalbum when others, such as myself, think her music is absolute shit and wouldn’t pay a dime to listen to it. i can’t think of any other theory of value that explains all of those phenomena.

Capitalist libertarians always talk about value as a price. Value isn’t price. Price is an abstraction that is, at least, one or two steps removed from value. It’s a social form of thinking about value that permits universal, almost instantaneous recognition of value, that is supposed to be guaranteed by law and/or custom. Price is not natural. It’s regulated. Price is never a precise representation of value, it’s a convenient one that can mean the same thing to everyone who recognizes it. 1$ = 1$, and always will. It doesn’t take a genius to see that this apple doesn’t always equal that apple, that this sofa always equals that sofa, while one dollar always equals one dollar.

We regulate price. We cannot regulate value. However, that doesn’t mean value is subjective in the way you’d like it to be. And I know for a fact that you’re oversimplifying even the Austrian economic theory here to make a point that isn’t worth making.

(Source: rigatonideology)

Great discussion with Alan Freeman, a Marxist economist, on money and gold. Refreshing to listen to someone who knows what they’re talking about as opposed to the pseudo-libertarian nonsense that abounds within the internet.

dagHomework: Where is a better example of reactionary and regressive white power in public discourse but in the common plea for us to look at “factual evidence”?

HINT: Consider what someone could mean by differentiating “the evidence” from “the factual evidence”.

Yesterday, we considered the construction of whiteness and ethnicity. It’s important. To ignore how traditional white power globally defines the concept of race is white supremacist. I’m insisting we can’t bracket whiteness and white supremacy, no matter where we’re addressing what people want to call racism. In addition, I’ll always demand we permit intersectionality. As far as I’m concerned, the white power structure uses capitalism to transmit its ideological demands. Capitalism is a white supremacist practice and part of what Hayek defined as the spontaneous social order of the free market. White power is the stabilizing social force of the free market. To be a capitalist is, in many ways, to be a white supremacist.

Today, I want us to examine the demand for specific kinds of evidence in public discourse. It’s relevant considering the KONY2012 campaign—a social movement, I argue, absolutely fueled by reactionary and regressive white power that’s invested all its faith (in economics and social justice) in the imaginary free-market.

On Graeber’s Grand Narrative

I’m still reading Graeber’s book. Maybe I’ll try to finish it this weekend. It’s full of problems, yet seems to gleefully overlook them as it attempts to create a grand narrative. Very Nietzschean. (Problems that any author who wants to create a grand narrative for thinking about past events has to embrace.)

Just look at how it’s gotten Thee Marxists all worked up. Love it when that happens. Crooked Timber’s breakdown of the book is very good. That’s a solid blog and I was thrilled to see a seminar on the book. Highly recommended. I figured MarxandSparks would get to linking to it, but Interruptions got there first. I’m not going to thoroughly read the posts until I’ve finished the book.

*** *** ***

Crooked Timber’s “seminar” on David Graeber’s Debt is some of the best content on the internet this week. It’s all worth reading:

Chris Bertram, Introduction
John Quiggin, The unmourned death of the double coincidence
Henry Farrell: The world economy is not a tribute system
Barry Finger Debt jubilee or global deleveraging
John Quiggin (slight return): The end of debt
Neville Morley: The return of grand narrative in the human sciences
Malcolm Harris: The dangers of pricing the infinite
Daniel Davies Too big to fail: the first 5000 years
Lou Brown: Good to think with
Richard Ashcroft: Money out of place: ‘debt’ and incentives
Rob Horning: Debt on the 12th planet

(Source: interruptions, via what-was-e-schatology)